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POLICY ANALYSIS 
THE DOHA ROUND – FREER AND FAIRER TRADE? 
The Doha Round is the latest in a series of nine ‘Rounds’ of global trade negotiations. These Rounds have the 
aim of reducing trade barriers, a process that many economists believe will benefit developing and developed 
countries alike. The current Round started in Doha, Qatar, and was supposed to put the interests of developing 
countries first. 
Since then, two deadlines for the conclusion of the Round have been missed: an official deadline in January 
2005; and an unofficial deadline at the end of 2006. The current goal is to conclude the Round by the end of 
2008. 
• Optimistic estimates of the likely gains from a successful agreement are around $182bn (£91bn) of 
which about half ($90bn/£45bn) may accrue to developing countries. But under more realistic 
scenarios, the gains from successful completion of the Round are likely to be much smaller. 
 
• More than 60% of any gains will come from agricultural trade reform, including a substantial cut in 
tariffs and subsidies. The United States and the European Union continue to have high agricultural 
tariffs. These account for almost 40% of the value of total agricultural output and high tariffs persist on 
some products.  
 
• Agriculture reform will not benefit all developing countries equally, with large agricultural exporters 
receiving a disproportionate share of the gains. Some less developed countries, particularly those that 
are net importers of food, may become worse off as a result of the reduced subsidies on imported 
foodstuffs. This could have an adverse impact on the urban poor in developing countries. 
 
• The Round has arguably focused too much on agriculture. Some tariffs on industrial goods remain 
high, and reform to labour-intensive services, temporary migration schemes, and efforts to increase 
export capacity in developing countries are important issues. These have received little attention in the 
agenda.  
 
• Developing countries are anxious to avoid repeating their mistake in the (previous) Uruguay Round, 
where they exchanged concrete liberalisation commitments for poorly defined promises of assistance 
that did not materialise. An ‘aid for trade’ scheme, in which developed countries agree to help 
developing countries adjust to lower tariff barriers is yet to be agreed.  
 
• The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have little to gain from the issues that remain on 
the agenda. Many of them already receive free market access through preferential schemes. Further 
general tariff reductions will reduce their trade advantage over other developing countries. These 
countries could block progress in the Round if they feel they are not benefiting sufficiently. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva in 
July 2008 is to agree a broad outline of the final agreement of the Doha Development 
Agenda. 
The Doha Development Agenda was launched in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, at the 
WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference. The conference endorsed the ‘Doha Declaration’ – a 
statement that focused the agenda on the concerns of the developing countries.  
This agenda included reform to agriculture (particularly reductions in subsidies and tariffs 
provided by developed countries), reductions in industrial tariffs and special treatment of 
poor countries (through exemptions from burdensome commitments, and promises of 
financial assistance). It also promised to redress some of the imbalances from the previous 
Round, particularly in the area of public health and intellectual property rights. 
This ‘Doha Round’ - the ninth of a series of such negotiations, and the first since the 
formalisation of trade negotiations under the WTO1 - came to be commonly referred to as the 
‘Development Round’. 
The rocky road from Doha to Geneva 
Less than two years after the Doha Declaration, it had become clear that the Round was 
seriously off track. In September 2003, the WTO convened another ministerial meeting in 
Cancun, Mexico, with the special task to ‘take stock of progress in the [Doha Development 
Agenda] negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance and take decisions as 
necessary.’ After four days the meeting ended abruptly without agreement on any of the main 
issues. Many of the participants in the Cancun meeting felt that the European Union and the 
United States had broken the promises that they had made at Doha, especially by the lack of 
progress in agriculture.  
Many developing countries and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) viewed agriculture 
as the primary objective of the Round, and were disappointed that there had been little 
progress in the two years after Doha. When the United States and the European Union finally 
presented a joint paper on agricultural issues in August 2003, the framework was widely 
criticised by developing countries for ignoring their interests.2 At the same time, agricultural 
lobbies within developed countries seemed to be undermining negotiations. The US Farm 
Bill in 2002 increased the level of support to US farmers3 and strengthened the link between 
                                                 
1 The first Round, held in Geneva in 1947, resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which the WTO formally replaced in 1995. 
2 See the statements by Indian Ambassador KM Chandrasekhar, Brazil’s Ambassador Luis Felipe de Seixas 
Correa, and China’s Ambassador Sun Zhenyu (TWN 2003). 
3 The US Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of May 2002 has a value of about $190 billion over 
the next ten years, about $83 billion more than under previous programmes. It sets target prices that are lower 
than the pre-1996 levels, but the total effective support is larger because average world commodity prices have 
declined and the range of commodities included in FSIRA is larger than in the 1996 FAIR Act. That act was 
intended to phase out farm subsidies, but even before the passage of FSRIA, farmers had achieved additional 
support through emergency measures. 
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subsidies and production decisions.4 One year later, the European Union’s 2003 Luxembourg 
reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) was also disappointing.  
In addition to their disappointment on 
agriculture, developing countries were 
sceptical about the effects of the new 
items on the agenda – the so-called 
Singapore Issues.5 In the space of a 
month from early June 2003, 77 
developing countries (over half of the 
WTO membership) made public 
statements urging that the Singapore 
Issues not be included as part of the 
Doha Round.6  
Since these issues are not priorities for 
developing countries, their growing 
importance in the agenda prior to Cancun 
seemed to be at odds with the objective 
of the Development Round. 
After Cancun, the Round was put back 
on track at a special meeting in July 
2004, which agreed to restart the 
negotiations, albeit at a much lower level 
of ambition. Most of the Singapore 
Issues were dropped from the agenda. It 
was agreed that the poorest countries 
would not be asked to make new 
commitments in the Round – they would 
get the ‘Round for free’. 
In agriculture, progress was made in several important areas. Developed countries promised 
to eliminate export subsidies, to increase regulation of production subsidies, and to adopt a 
‘tiered formula’ for tariff reductions whereby the highest tariffs would be reduced the most. 
These broad issues set forth in the ‘July 2004 framework’ set the parameters for the ensuing 
negotiations. 
December 2005 saw the last ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. These negotiations fell short 
of expectations, even though the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, claimed that 
‘We have managed to put the Round back on track after a period of hibernation’. 
                                                 
4 It provides counter cyclical payments (CCPs) to US farmers, which respond negatively to the world prices. 
This type of measure has allowed the United States to dump its farm surplus on world markets. For example, the 
United States exports corn at prices 20% below the cost of production, and wheat at 46% below cost. 
5 Ministers from WTO member countries decided at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference to establish 
three new working groups: on trade and investment; on competition policy; and on transparency in government 
procurement. They also instructed the WTO Goods Council to consider ways of simplifying trade procedures, 
an issue sometimes known as ‘trade facilitation’. Because these issues were introduced to the agenda at the 
Singapore ministerial meeting, they are often called the ‘Singapore Issues’.  
6 CAFOD (2003) ‘Singapore Issues in the WTO: What do developing countries say?’  
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The substantive issues agreed at Hong Kong include an end to export subsidies for agriculture 
(by 2013), an agreement on cotton, and broad agreements setting the direction of future 
negotiations in non-agricultural products and services. But many had hoped for more from 
the talks. 
What are the potential gains? 
The projected gains from concluding the Round will be determined by the content of the final 
agreement.  
The World Bank’s estimates suggest that full liberalisation of agriculture following the 
parameters laid out in the July 2004 agreements would lead to a total global welfare gain of 
$182 billion. Developing countries are estimated to gain $90bn (see table). 
Percentage of developing 
country welfare gains due 
to reform by: 
Agriculture 
and food 
policies 
Other 
manufacturing. 
tariffs 
All goods 
trade 
policies 
High-income countries 29% 21 % 50 % 
Developing countries 33 % 17 % 50 % 
All countries’ policies 62 % 38 % 100 % 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
But these figures represent the most ambitious outcome: a complete reduction of export 
subsidies, removal of agricultural tariffs and elimination of all manufacturing tariffs. If the 
Round is more limited, the gains would be significantly smaller. A 75% cut in tariffs would 
generate global welfare gains of about $75 billion. Other limitations which are likely to be 
included in the agenda - such as continued protection for a small group of ‘sensitive’ products 
- would also significantly reduce the projected gains.  
So even if the Round is successfully completed, it is likely that the gains will be modest.  
What else could be done to increase the gains of developing countries? 
There is a broad agenda beyond agriculture that would deliver benefits to the poorest 
countries, but which has been almost entirely ignored in the Doha Round. For example, there 
is much that could be done to reduce tariffs on industrial goods. Rich countries’ tariffs are 
heavily biased against exports from poor countries, especially labour-intensive industrial 
goods and processed foods. Rich countries collect tariffs four times higher on their imports 
from poor countries than imports from other rich countries.  
There is also much that could be done to increase the mobility of workers. Migration - 
particularly temporary schemes to allow workers from developing countries to work on short 
term projects in rich countries - would enable workers from poor countries to fill labour 
shortages in rich countries and send part of their pay back to their families. The flow of 
remittances from migrant workers in rich countries is an important source of development 
finance and now exceeds total aid flows from rich countries.  
Finally, the Doha Round needs to get serious about ‘aid for trade’. In recent years the 
European Union and the United States have slashed tariffs to the world’s poorest countries 
under special schemes granting them free market access. Yet despite the good intentions 
behind these schemes, we have witnessed almost no increase in the volume of exports from 
beneficiary countries. 
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This shows that for the poorest countries, market access is not enough. Without assistance to 
improve crumbling infrastructure, boost product quality, and connect to international supply 
chains, tariff cuts have little effect on trade from the very poorest countries. 
Another explanation for the very low responsiveness from the poorest countries to the tariff 
concessions is that they are largely based on the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
Under the GSP, rich countries can take their concessions away just as easily as they give 
them. This means that there is a perennial implicit threat that ‘too many exports’ could induce 
the withdrawal of preferences. 
Clearly, this does little to promote private interest in exporting activities. If the rich countries 
committed to making the tariff concessions under the GSP permanent, this would reduce the 
risk associated with exporting, thus encouraging entrepreneurship in export businesses in the 
poorest countries. 
A successful Development Round will partly depend on how it is implemented. Trade reform 
can be costly – it takes time for new industries to emerge to replace industries that cannot 
survive in the face of global competition. These adjustment costs are the price of the benefits 
of trade liberalisation. 
It is these costs and the trade benefits that determine the net effect of trade reform for each 
country. If the Development Round is to bring widespread benefits, the developed world 
must make a stronger commitment than it has in the past to help the developing world not 
only to bear the costs, but also to avail itself of the opportunities provided by a more 
integrated global economy. 
Evaluation  
Many developing countries feel that the low ambition of the Round following the collapse at 
Cancun is disappointing, and that the Round has failed to deliver on its development promise.  
This situation is unfortunate, and offers the possibility that no agreement will be reached in 
Geneva. This would be unfortunate, since the world has much to gain from a Development 
Round. But achieving this will require major changes in the negotiating positions of both the 
developed and developing countries. 
ENDS 
For further information 
Contact Emanuel Ornelas: e.a.ornelas@lse.ac.uk; or Helen Durrant on +44 (0)20 7955 7395 
(h.durrant@lse.ac.uk).  
